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Abstract
This paper presents a model where income inequality negatively aﬀects
economic growth through corruption by politicians. While politicians pur-
sue corruption rents that reduce the provision of public goods and sacriﬁce
citizen’s welfare, they are also concerned about the political support of
citizens to maintain their political power. When inequality among citizens
is large, political support is less sensitive to corruption. Therefore, large
inequality increases corruption and impedes economic growth. Since cor-
ruption is more prevalent in poor countries than rich ones, our argument
is consistent with the evidence that shows a negative relationship between
inequality and growth in poor countries.
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The relationship between inequality and economic growth has attracted the
interest of many economists; it has been investigated both empirically and the-
oretically. Regarding empirical literature, although some studies demonstrate
that inequality has a positive impact on economic growth (e.g., Forbes 2000),
overall, many studies show that inequality has a negative impact on economic
growth (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994, and Per-
otti 1996).1 Among empirical studies, the evidence presented by Deininger
and Squire (1998) and Barro (2000) is very meaningful. Deininger and Squire
(1998) reveal that inequality in assets has a negative impact on economic growth
and that this negative relationship is observed only in nondemocratic countries.
Moreover, Barro (2000) divides countries into rich and poor ones and ﬁnds that
the eﬀect of inequality on growth is negative in poor countries but positive in
rich ones.2
As mentioned below, however, there is no consensus about the underlying
mechanism that relates inequality to economic growth. The purpose of this
paper is to explain the above negative relationship, particularly in poor and
nondemocratic countries, by another mechanism that is not considered in pre-
vious studies. This paper focuses on the role of corruption by politicians as a
channel through which inequality hinders economic growth. When inequality
among citizens is large, their political preferences are largely dispersed. The
dispersed political preferences render public support for an incumbent politi-
cian less responsive to corruption, and the incumbent politician’s beneﬁt from
decreasing corruption rent reduces. Hence, when inequality is large, the incum-
bent politician extracts a large corruption rent, which harms investment and
growth.
Corruption is more prevalent in poor countries than rich ones, and many
studies point out that it would be one of important factors that prevent many
less developed countries from achieving steady economic growth. In his seminal
paper, Mauro (1995) ﬁnds that corruption hinders investment and economic
growth and that its negative eﬀects are substantial.3 These ﬁndings imply that
the determinants of corruption should be largely related to economic growth.
Evidences found by recent empirical studies show that inequality is one of the
important determinants of corruption. Jong-Sung and Khagram (2005) demon-
strate that income inequality has a positive and substantial impact on corrup-
tion. In their study, they argue that “corruption is likely to be an important
1See Benabou (1996) for a survey of this literature.
2In poor countries, the positive impact of inequality on economic growth found by Forbes
(2000) is not applicable since his analysis excludes very poor countries owing to data limita-
tions.
3Similar results are obtained by many studies. For instance, see Knack and Keefer (1995),
Mauro (1997), and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997).
1channel through which inequality adversely aﬀects economic growth” (p. 154).
Keefer and Knack (2002) conﬁrm the importance of this channel in a more
rigorous way. They ﬁnd that inequality decreases the level of property rights
protection and that the coeﬃcient of income inequality in growth regression
largely declines when adding the term of property rights protection. This evi-
dence suggests that the deterioration of property rights protection is the primary
channel of the eﬀect of inequality on growth. Since property rights protection
is closely connected to corruption, their ﬁndings support the hypothesis that
inequality decreases economic growth through increase in corruption.4
Although the above studies suggest that inequality aﬀects economic growth
through corruption, these studies do not provide any formal models explaining
why inequality promotes corruption.5 Motivated by these studies, the present
paper builds a theoretical model providing a new explanation that connects
inequality, corruption, and growth. The basic mechanism of our results is ex-
plained as follows. We consider an economy where citizens and politicians exist.
The citizens invest in education, work as economic agents, and decide whether
or not to approve an incumbent politician as a political leader. The return of in-
vestment is heterogeneous among the citizens and depends on the level of public
goods provided by the politician. Therefore, political preferences are also het-
erogeneous among the citizens. Although the politician can extract corruption
rent, which reduces public goods provision and decreases the welfare of citi-
zens, the citizens can restrict corruption to some degree by not supporting the
politician. When a large share of the citizens disapprove him/her, the politician
is likely to lose political power and obtain nothing. Therefore, he/she faces a
trade-oﬀ between extracting corruption rent and maintaining political power.
When inequality among the citizens is large, their political preferences are
largely dispersed. In such a situation, a marginal decrease in corruption does not
considerably increase the number of citizens who change their political attitude
from disapproval to approval. Therefore, when inequality is large, political
support is less responsive to a decrease in corruption (i.e., the return of reducing
corruption is small for the politician). Consequently, the politician engages in
substantial corruption. Furthermore, since the return of educational investment
depends negatively on the level of corruption (or positively on the level of public
4Corrupted politicians would not prefer the protection of property rights because it reduces
the scope for extraction of corruption rent. Therefore, when the level of corruption is large,
property rights would not be protected well. Keefer and Knack (2002) use the index of
property right that includes a measure of corruption in the government.
5Jong-Sung and Khagram (2005) argue that, in a society where inequality is large, rich
people have a large incentive and resources for corruption to protect their wealth. Further-
more, they argue that inequality leads to decadence of social norms that restrain corruption.
In contrast, Keefer and Knack (2002) argue that inequality makes the government attitude
toward property rights unsteady. However, they do not provide any formal theoretical models
to support these claims.
2goods provision), an increase in corruption decreases the level of investment.
Through this mechanism, inequality impedes economic growth.
The basic mechanism is similar to the probabilistic voting model (Lindbeck
and Weibull 1987; Persson and Tabellini 2000).6 As in the probabilistic vot-
ing model, the less dispersed the distribution of citizens’ political preferences,
the more politicians must be concerned about their welfare since the share of
supporters is more responsive to the policy choice. This paper is also closely re-
lated to studies on political agency models that explore how citizens can control
incumbent politicians who have some political power and enjoy the advantage
of incumbency (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Persson and Tabellini 2000, Chap-
ter 4). The most important diﬀerence between the above studies and ours is
that, in this paper, the equilibrium level of corruption depends on heterogeneity
among citizens. Furthermore, unlike the standard models, when citizens disap-
prove an incumbent politician, political disorder occurs. This set up enables the
incumbent politician to extract rents in this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys previous
work on inequality and growth. Section 3 builds the model and discusses some
important assumptions. Section 4 deﬁnes equilibrium, solves the model, and
shows how inequality increases equilibrium corruption. Section 5 analyzes the
eﬀect of inequality on equilibrium growth and discusses the prediction of the
model. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Previous Work on Inequality and Growth
Many theoretical studies have attempted to explain how inequality aﬀects growth.
Roughly speaking, theoretical studies on the relationship between inequality and
growth can be divided into two main streams: the credit market imperfections
approach and the political redistribution approach. Galor and Zeira (1993),
emphasizing credit market imperfections, analyze the eﬀects of inequality on
economic growth. Credit market imperfections make poor individuals unable to
invest in human capital even if the return to education is suﬃciently high. Since
a large inequality makes the credit constraint binding for many agents, it de-
creases the aggregate level of human capital investment and impedes economic
growth.
In contrast, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994)
focus on the political economic mechanism that connects inequality to growth.
6Persson and Tabellini (2000) also provide a model that applies the probabilistic voting
model to study the corruption by politicians. While they analyze how electoral competition
before a politician holds oﬃce aﬀects his/her corruption rent, this paper focuses on how
citizens can control a politician who is already in power and does not assume the existence of
electoral competition. In the former model, the equilibrium corruption rent is independent of
heterogeneity among citizens. This is the most important diﬀerence.
3In their models, individuals vote on redistributive policies that are ﬁnanced by
distortionary taxes as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). They argue that a large
inequality increases the demand of the median voter for redistribution. Since
large redistribution discourages the incentive for investment, a large inequality
is related to lower economic growth.7
However, the existing explanations mentioned above are not supported by
empirical studies. If credit market imperfections are crucial for the relation-
ship between inequality and growth, the extent of credit market development
would have critical eﬀects on it. For instance, in countries with immature credit
markets, inequality would impede economic growth strongly. However, Barro
(2000) ﬁnds that the extent of credit market development does not signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the relationship between inequality and growth.8
Some empirical studies are not consistent with the redistribution approach.
Although the theory implies a positive relationship between inequality and re-
distribution and a negative relationship between redistribution and economic
growth, Perotti (1996) argues that both of these relationships are not sup-
ported empirically. Moreover, evidences that focus on the political system do
not support the redistribution approach. The redistribution approach is based
on democratic electoral systems. Therefore, if the redistribution channel is cru-
cial in the relationship between inequality and growth, the negative eﬀect of
inequality on growth would be larger in democratic countries. However, this
is against the evidences found by Knack and Keefer (1997) and Deininger and
Squire (1998).9
As for previous studies on inequality and growth, Helpman (2004) states
that “although we can argue with limited conﬁdence that inequality within a
country slows its growth, we cannot say much about the channels through which
this inﬂuence plays out” (pp. 93-94). This paper contributes to the literature
by providing an alternative model to explain the relationship between inequality
and growth.
7Similar models are presented by Perotti (1993), Bertola (1993), and Benabou (1996).
8Deininger and Squire (1998) ﬁnd that inequality harms educational investment and that
a negative relationship between inequality and growth is found in nondemocratic countries,
which tend to have immature credit markets. They argue that these evidences are consistent
with the credit market imperfections approach. However, the model of this paper also predicts
that inequality harms educational investment and growth in nondemocratic countries.
9Knack and Keefer (1997) investigate the relationship between inequality and economic
growth in democracies and nondemocracies and conclude that the impact of inequality in
nondemocracies is not signiﬁcantly lower than that in democracies.
43 The Model
3.1 Basic Environment
We consider an overlapping generations economy where agents live for two pe-
riods. They have same preferences and production technology, but they diﬀer
in their human capital within each generation. There is no population growth,
and the population of each generation is normalized to one. In the ﬁrst period
(childhood), agents invest in education. In the second period (adulthood), they
produce consumption goods and consume them. The agents are risk neutral,
and they derive utility from their consumption when they become adults.
The level of human capital of each agent depends on his or her own educa-
tional expenditure and parental human capital. We assume a Cobb-Douglas-
type human capital production function
hit+1 =
1
ϕ
e
ϕ
ith
1−ϕ
it , ϕ 2 (0,1), (1)
where hit+1 denotes the level of human capital of the agent born at period t and
belongs to the dynasty i, and eit is his or her educational expenditure. The dif-
ference in human capital is the only source of income inequality in the economy.
While the externality of parental human capital enables the economy to attain
long-run growth, it also causes the inequality of the proceeding generation to
be taken over to the succeeding generation.
We suppose that the distribution of human capital in the initial generation
is uniform with support
[
1  
ξ
2
,1 +
ξ
2
]
, ξ 2 (0,2).
The mean of the distribution is normalized to one, and the density is given by
1/ξ. As we will see later, in equilibrium, the level of the human capital of each
dynasty is proportional to the parental human capital. Thus, the distribution
of the human capital of each generation is uniform, where the density depends
negatively on ξ. Therefore, parameter ξ captures the degree of inequality in the
economy.
As an adult, each agent produces consumption goods. The output level
depends not only on his or her human capital but also on public goods. By
providing productive public goods, the government can enhance the productivity
of citizens. Public goods may include public services such as maintenance of law
and order or protection of property rights. The production technology of each
citizen is represented by the following production function
yit = (1 + αgt)hit, gt =
Gt
¯ ht
, (2)
5where Gt denotes total government expenditure on public good provision and
¯ ht 
∫
hitdi denotes the average (or aggregate) level of human capital at period
t. Parameter α captures the eﬃciency of the public good. We assume that the
production depends on the ratio of the amount of public goods to the average
level of human capital. We can interpret the average level of human capital as
the scale of economic activity. This formulation reﬂects a type of congestion ef-
fect. The larger the scale of economic activity, the larger is the required amount
of public goods to produce one unit of consumption good. As the economy
develops, more people use infrastructure, and the resulting congestion decreases
the eﬃciency of public goods. Furthermore, the administrative procedure be-
comes more complicated, which decreases the eﬃciency of legal infrastructure.
Therefore, the government must increase public expenditure to maintain the
productive eﬃciency of citizens as the economy develops.
Equation (2) implies that public goods have complementarity with human
capital, and thus, the return of educational investment is increasing in the level
of public goods at the next period. Therefore, the provision of public goods by
the government inﬂuences not only the level of output but also the growth of
output through educational investment. We will return to this point later in
the paper.
3.2 Political Events
Public policy is endogenously determined by the following political process.
There are a large number of homogeneous politicians. In each period, one of
them randomly gains political power; we call this politician the “incumbent.”
One interpretation of this setup is the lack of a commitment device to enforce
politicians to stand by their campaign promise. If politicians cannot commit
their promised policies ex ante, the politician who acquires political power would
be randomly determined since all politicians are homogeneous. Electoral com-
petition based on promised policies requires mature democratic institutions and
customs. However, in most of the developing countries, democratic institutions
are immature. Thus, assuming that politicians cannot commit their promised
policies seems to be realistic.
The incumbent levies lump-sum tax on adult citizens and allocates tax rev-
enue between public good provision and corruption rent.10 We assume that the
incumbent cannot issue public debt. The budget constraint in each period is
10In our model, the government cannot set a diﬀerent policy for each citizen. That is, the
government cannot increase the support of citizens by oﬀering a policy that is favorable to
a speciﬁc group in the economy. To provide such a policy, the government needs a mature
bureaucracy. However, in many developing countries, such a mature bureaucracy does not
exist.
6given by
πt + Gt = Tt, (3)
where πt and Tt denote corruption rent and lump-sum tax at period t respec-
tively. Reﬂecting the incapacity of taxation in developing countries, we assume
that there is an upper limit of tax level ¯ Tt.11 Furthermore, we assume that the
limit grows proportionally to the scale of the economy; that is,
¯ Tt = τ¯ ht, τ > 0. (4)
As mentioned above, since the selection of the incumbent is an entirely
random event, there is no room for political control in determining who gets
political power. However, citizens can control the behavior of the incumbent
to some degree by ex post political control. After observing the policy package
that the incumbent chooses, each citizen decides whether or not to support the
incumbent. If many citizens choose not to support the incumbent, political
disorder may occur. In this case, the incumbent loses political power and does
not obtain any corruption rent. In addition, political disorder breaks down the
function of the public sector, and thus, G = T = 0 is implemented.12 In many
developing countries, a change of the government usually occurs in a violent
manner, for example, a coup, civil war, and revolution. In these countries,
political disorder may be very severe and may eliminate the function of the
public sector.
In order to sustain political power, the incumbent must consider the welfare
of citizens; that is, the ex post judgment of citizens pressurizes the incumbent
to restrict the corruption rent. The probability of whether political disorder
occurs or not depends on the share of the supporters. For simplicity, we assume
that the probability of the incumbent retaining power is equal to the share of
the supporters.
In each period, political events occur according to the following timing.
1. Among many identical politicians, one politician is randomly assigned to
the ruling position.
2. The incumbent determines the policy plan (G,T) and citizens observe the
plan.
3. All adult citizens declare whether or not to support the incumbent.
11Acemoglu (2005) makes a similar assumption and argues that the limitation is due to
“citizens’ exit options.” As the factor creating the exit options, he lists the citizens’ “ability
to shift to informal production, to hide their revenues, or simply to disobey tax laws” (p.
1203).
12This assumption may seem to be quite extreme, but it is merely for simplicity. It is
suﬃcient to derive similar results assuming that political disorder decreases both the levels of
public goods and tax.
74. If the incumbent retains political power, he/she implements the planned
policy. If not, the incumbent loses political power and political disorder
occurs.
Note that, at the political stage, investment in education is already sunk
since only adult citizens participate in the political process. Therefore, the
incumbent cannot increase the current level of human capital by increasing
the provision of public goods. For the incumbent, the objective of increasing
this provision is not to stimulate investment and enlarge the tax base but to
increase the probability of retaining political power. Further, note that the
probability of holding political power in the next period is zero even if the
incumbent retains political power in the current period. This is because the
number of politicians is large, and political power in the next period is again
randomly assigned. Therefore, the problem of the incumbent is static; that is,
the incumbent maximizes the current period proﬁt, as we will see later.
4 Equilibrium
We brieﬂy deﬁne the equilibrium of this model. The politico-economic equilib-
rium must satisfy the following conditions. (i) Optimal educational investment:
Given the expected policy, each child must invest in education in order to maxi-
mize his or her income. (ii) Sincere support of citizens: Comparing the payoﬀ in
a politically stable situation and that in political disorder, each citizen sincerely
chooses whether to support the incumbent. (iii) Optimal policy making by the
incumbent: Taking into account the political action of citizens, the incumbent
determines the policy plan in order to maximize the expected corruption rent.
Before describing the formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium, we investigate
each problem separately.
4.1 Educational choice
First, we consider the optimal educational choice of each agent. Since the po-
litical stage follows educational choice, the return of education depends on the
political results in the next period. Hence, each agent expects the policy in the
next period and makes an educational choice according to the expectation. Sup-
pose that, at period t, each agent expects that the incumbent in the next period
will win political conﬁdence with probability ˆ pt+1 (that is, political disorder
will occur with probability 1   ˆ pt+1) and that the incumbent will announce the
policy package ( ˆ Gt+1, ˆ Tt+1). Then, the production of citizen i at period t+1 is
yit+1 =
{
(1 + αˆ gt+1)hit+1 with probability ˆ pt+1,
hit+1 with probability 1   ˆ pt+1,
8where ˆ gt+1 denotes the ratio of expected government expenditure ˆ Gt+1 to the
expected level of average human capital in period t + 1. The expected income
of the citizen is given by
E[yit+1] = ˆ pt+1[(1 + αˆ gt+1)hit+1   ˆ Tt+1] + (1   ˆ pt+1)hit+1. (5)
Each agent chooses the amount of educational expenditure in order to maximize
his or her expected consumption:
max
eit
(1 + αˆ pt+1ˆ gt+1)
e
ϕ
ith
1−ϕ
it
ϕ
  ˆ pt+1 ˆ Tt+1   eit. (6)
The ﬁrst order condition is
(1 + αˆ pt+1ˆ gt+1)e
ϕ−1
it h
1−ϕ
it = 1. (7)
Arranging the terms, we obtain
eit = (1 + αˆ pt+1ˆ gt+1)
1
1−ϕhit, (8)
hit+1 = (1 + αˆ pt+1ˆ gt+1)
ϕ
1−ϕhit. (9)
Equation (8) shows that the optimal educational investment has the following
properties. First, educational investment is increasing in the level of parental
human capital hit since the intergenerational externality of parental human cap-
ital makes the expected return of education increasing in hit. Second, each agent
makes a large educational investment when he or she expects that the incum-
bent in the next period will choose a large amount of provision of public goods.
Because of the complementarity between human capital and provision of public
goods in production technology, a larger amount of provision raises the expected
return of educational investment. In contrast, if citizens expect the incumbent
to extract a large corruption rent (or provide fewer public goods), the expected
return becomes low and citizens make a small investment. In other words, the
expectation of substantial corruption hinders economic growth. Educational
investment is also increasing in the expected probability of political stability
ˆ pt+1. When the economy is politically unstable, the provision of public goods is
discontinued, which lowers the return of education.13 Therefore, citizens choose
a low level of investment if they expect that the incumbent will lose political
power with high probability.
Equation (9) implies a positive linear relationship between a parent’s and a
child’s human capital; this makes the evolution of income distribution quite
simple. If the distribution of human capital of the preceding generation is
13Many studies analyze the relationship between political instability and investment. For
instance, see Alesina and Perotti (1996).
9uniform, that of the current generation also becomes uniform. Since we suppose
that human capital in the initial generation follows uniform distribution, the
distribution of human capital is always uniform in equilibrium. In addition, the
linearity of the human capital accumulation of each dynasty implies that the
relative human capital between any two dynasties is constant; that is, we have
8t,t′ 8i,j
hit
hjt
=
hit′
hjt′
. (10)
Therefore, the relative human capital of dynasty i to the average ˜ hit  hit/¯ ht
is constant in all periods. The following lemma summarizes these results.
Lemma 1. The optimal educational choice of each agent is represented by (8)
and (9). Educational expenditure eit is increasing in expected probability ˆ pt+1
and expected public spending ratio ˆ gt+1.
In equilibrium, the distribution of relative human capital ˜ hit is always uni-
form and the same as that of the initial generation
U
[(
1  
ξ
2
)
,
(
1 +
ξ
2
)]
. (11)
4.2 Political Choices of Citizens
Next, we consider the political action of citizens. We assume that each citizen
sincerely chooses whether or not to support the incumbent.14
Suppose that the incumbent chooses a policy (Gt,Tt) at period t. If the
policy is implemented, citizens can use public goods to produce consumption
good but must incur tax. Therefore, the income of a citizen with human capital
ht would be
VI(ht) = (1 + αgt)ht   Tt. (12)
In contrast, if the policy is rejected, there is no public good and tax, and the
income of the citizen is simply given by
VA(ht) = ht. (13)
We assume that the citizen supports the incumbent if VI(ht)  VA(ht), and
rejects the incumbent otherwise. By comparing (12) with (13), we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. The political action of citizens can be characterized by the threshold
ψ(θt) 
1
αθt
, (14)
14The assumption that citizens choose their political action sincerely is standard in the
literature of political economics. For instance, see Persson and Tabellini (2000).
10where θt  Gt
Tt 2 [0,1] is the ratio of public spending to tax revenue. If ˜ hit  (<
)ψ(θt), citizen i supports (rejects) the incumbent.
The threshold ψ is decreasing in θt; that is, a higher public spending ratio
increases the number of citizens who support the incumbent.
The interpretation of Lemma 2 is quite simple. Since there exists comple-
mentarity between public good and human capital, richer citizens receive more
beneﬁt from political stability where some public good would be provided. In
contrast, all citizens have to incur the same lump-sum tax. Therefore, rich
citizens tend to support the incumbent but poor ones do not. The number of
supporters is increasing in the amount of public goods and decreasing in lump-
sum tax. In particular, it depends only on the ratio of public spending to tax
revenue.
In equilibrium, the distribution of relative human capital is always given by
(11). From (11) and (14), we can derive the number of citizens who support
the incumbent. In order to make the analysis more meaningful, we make the
following assumption.
Assumption 1. We impose the following condition:
1  
ξ
2
<
1
α
< 1 +
ξ
2
. (15)
The ﬁrst inequality implies that there are citizens who do not support the
incumbent even if the incumbent does not engage in any corruption. The second
inequality implies that there are some citizens who support the incumbent if the
incumbent does not engage in any corruption.
Under Assumption 1, a risk of political disorder always exists, but the in-
cumbent can retain political power with positive probability if corruption is
suﬃciently small. As mentioned below, by imposing Assumption 1, the prob-
lem of the incumbent has a unique inner solution.
The probability that the incumbent retains political power, which coincides
with the share of citizens who support the incumbent, is equal to the size of the
population whose relative human capital exceeds threshold ψ(θ) and given by
p(θt;ξ) =
∫ max{1+
ξ
2,ψ(θt)}
ψ(θt)
1
ξ
d˜ h
=



0 if 0  θt  1
α(1+
ξ
2),
1
2 + 1
ξ
(
1   1
αθt
)
if 1
α(1+
ξ
2) < θt  1.
(16)
Note that this probability is independent of the average level of human capital
since only the relative human capital is important for the supporting behavior
of citizens. Probability p is increasing and concave with respect to the ratio of
11public spending to tax revenue θ; that is, an increase in the public spending
ratio raises the probability of winning political conﬁdence, but the marginal
increase is decreasing in θ. Furthermore, an increase in the eﬃciency of public
good α increases the cost of political disorder, thereby increasing the share of
supporters.
The property of the derivative of function p(θ;ξ) is notable. By diﬀerentiat-
ing p with respect to θ, we obtain
∂p
∂θ
(θ;ξ) =



0 if 0  θ  1
α(1+
ξ
2),
1
ξαθ2 if 1
α(1+
ξ
2) < θ  1.
(17)
Note that the derivative
∂p
∂θ(θ;ξ) is decreasing in ξ. This means that, when
inequality is large, marginal decrease in corruption does not increase consider-
ably the probability of the incumbent retaining power. This interpretation is
explained as follows. Suppose that there are two economies: an equal economy
and an unequal one. The density of human capital distribution 1/ξ is large in
the equal economy and small in the unequal one. In the unequal economy, the
political preferences of citizens are dispersed because the distribution of human
capital is dispersed. Note that threshold ψ is independent of the distribution
of human capital. Thus, the threshold that divides the political behavior of
citizens is the same in both of the economies. However, a change of policies
has a diﬀerent impact on the two economies. Suppose that there is a decrease
in corruption and the ratio of public good to tax revenue changes from θ to
θ′. This policy change increases the population that supports the incumbent
politician, but the size of the population that changes the political attitude is
diﬀerent from the two economies (see Figure 1). The increase of supporters due
to the decrease in corruption is lower in the unequal economy than the equal
one. This is because the density of human capital distribution is low in the
unequal economy. Therefore, when inequality is large, a marginal decrease in
corruption has a small impact on the probability of the incumbent retaining
power.15
4.3 Political Choice of the Incumbent
Finally, we proceed to investigating the problem of the incumbent. The in-
cumbent realizes that the probability that he or she retains political power is
given by (16). Since the incumbent can extract a political rent only if it retains
political power, the expected corruption rent of the incumbent is
πt = p(θt;ξ)(1   θt)Tt. (18)
15This mechanism is similar to the probabilistic voting model. See Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
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an increase in θ
1
ξ
1
ξ′
1
αθ
1
αθ′
Figure 1: Marginal Eﬀect of Policy Changes
The incumbent chooses policy (θt,Tt) in order to maximize the expected cor-
ruption rent. However, since an upper limit of tax is assumed, it must hold
Tt  τ¯ ht. Then, the problem of the incumbent is given by
max
(θt,Tt)∈[0,1]×[0,τ ht]
p(θt;ξ)(1   θt)Tt. (19)
It is obvious that the upper limit of taxation is binding; therefore the rent-
maximizing tax level is
Tt = τ¯ ht. (20)
The public spending ratio is determined by comparing the cost and beneﬁt of
the provision of public goods. From (16), the incumbent certainly loses political
power if θt  1
α(1+ξ/2). Therefore, the incumbent must choose θt > 1
α(1+ξ/2) to
extract the positive expected rent.
From the ﬁrst-order condition, the rent-maximizing public spending ratio
satisﬁes
∂p
∂θt
(θt;ξ)(1   θt) = p(θt;ξ). (21)
The left-hand side of (21) represents the marginal beneﬁt of increasing θt, which
is from the increase in the probability of winning political conﬁdence. The right-
hand side represents the marginal cost of increasing θt, which arises from the
reduction of the corruption rent. By arranging the terms, we obtain
ϵp(θt;ξ) = ϵr(θt), (22)
where
ϵp(θ;ξ) 
∂p(θ;ξ)
∂θ
θ
p(θ;ξ)
=
1
αθ
(
1 +
ξ
2
)
  1
, ϵr(θ) 
θ
1   θ
.
13ϵp is the elasticity of the probability of winning political conﬁdence with respect
to θ, and ϵr is the elasticity of the corruption rent with respect to θ. The
maximization of the expected rent requires these two rates to be equal.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1, the rent-maximization problem of the incum-
bent, which is represented by (19), has a unique solution.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now, we proceed to the main concern of this paper: how does inequal-
ity aﬀect the provision of public goods and corruption? The elasticity of the
probability of winning political conﬁdence to θ is shown to be decreasing in ξ,
i.e.,
∂ϵp
∂ξ (θ;ξ)  0. As explained above, when inequality is large, a decrease in
corruption does not increase considerably the probability of winning political
conﬁdence; that is, large inequality weakens the response of probability p to an
increase in θ. Thus, it reduces the elasticity of the probability. In contrast, the
elasticity of the corruption rent to θ does not depend on the degree of inequality
ξ. Since an increase in ξ shifts ϵp downward but keeps ϵr constant, in equilib-
rium, the rent-maximizing public spending ratio is decreasing in ξ (see Figure
2). In fact, we can analytically solve the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to θ
and obtain
θt =
[
α
(
1 +
ξ
2
)]− 1
2
 θ(ξ). (23)
Clearly, the rent-maximizing public spending ratio is time-independent and de-
creasing in ξ.
Proposition 1. The ratio of the provision of public goods to tax revenue that the
incumbent chooses is decreasing in the degree of inequality ξ. That is, corruption
by the incumbent is large (small) in an unequal (equal) economy.
Taking the above argument in account, the politico-economic equilibrium
can be deﬁned as follows.
Denition 1. The politico-economic equilibrium is deﬁned by f(h∗
it)i∈[0,1],θ∗
t,T ∗
t ,p∗
tg∞
t=0
that satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. Citizens invest in human capital so as to maximize their expected utility
and predict the future policy correctly. That is, (8) and (9) must hold for
all t  0 and the expected policy satisﬁes
8t ˆ gt =
θ∗
tT∗
t
¯ h∗
t
, ˆ pt = p∗
t.
2. Citizens sincerely determine whether or not to support the incumbent. As
a result, the probability of political stability is given by
8t p∗
t = p(θ∗
t;ξ).
14an increase in ξ
ϵr(θ)
θ
1
α(1+
ξ
2)
1
ϵp(θ;ξ)
Figure 2: Equilibrium Corruption
3. In each period t, the incumbent sets policy gt so as to maximize the expected
corruption rent. That is, we obtain
8t θ∗
t = θ(ξ), T ∗
t = τ¯ h∗
t.
5 Equilibrium Growth Rate and Inequality
In the previous section, we have shown that inequality encourages corruption
by the incumbent. Now, we conﬁrm that inequality impedes economic growth
through corruption.
In the equilibrium, the growth rate of the average human capital is given by
¯ ht+1
¯ ht
= [1 + ατp(θ(ξ);ξ)θ(ξ)]
ϕ
1−ϕ  γh(ξ). (24)
Equation (24) shows that inequality aﬀects human capital accumulation through
two channels. First, as mentioned above, an increase in the degree of inequality ξ
reduces the equilibrium public spending ratio θ∗, which directly reduces human
capital investment. Second, an increase in ξ changes the probability of political
stability p∗. The impact of inequality on the probability is not very obvious.
By diﬀerentiating function p∗, we obtain
dp∗
dξ
=
∂p
∂θ
[θ(ξ),ξ]θ′(ξ) +
∂p
∂ξ
[θ(ξ),ξ]. (25)
Keeping the distribution of human capital ﬁxed, a decrease in the public spend-
ing ratio θ∗ caused by an increase in ξ reduces the probability of political sta-
bility (corruption eﬀect). The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of (25) captures
15this eﬀect. In addition, a change of ξ transforms the distribution of human cap-
ital itself (distribution eﬀect). The second term of the right-hand side of (25)
captures this eﬀect, whose sign is ambiguous. In general, whether inequality
reduces the probability of political stability depends on the exogenous parame-
ters. In this paper, we focus on the role of corruption; therefore we impose the
following assumption, which assures that the corruption eﬀect dominates the
distribution eﬀect in the equilibrium.16
Assumption 2. We assume that the following relationship holds:
α >
(
1 +
ξ
4
)2
(
1 +
ξ
2
) .
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium probability of political
stability p∗ is decreasing in ξ.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, we investigate the eﬀect of inequality on the growth of output. Note
that under Assumptions 1 and 2, both θ(ξ) and p(θ(ξ);ξ) are decreasing in ξ,
and therefore, inequality reduces the growth rate of the average human capital.
However, whether or not the provision of public goods will be maintained in the
next period is stochastic; therefore, the output also follows a stochastic process.
The equilibrium output at period t, y∗
t, is given by
y∗
t =
{
[1 + ατθ(ξ)]¯ h∗
t with probability p(θ(ξ);ξ),
¯ h∗
t with probability 1   p(θ(ξ);ξ).
Therefore, the expected level of equilibrium output is given by
E(y∗
t) = [1 + ατp(θ(ξ);ξ)θ(ξ)]¯ h∗
t.
Let us deﬁne the average growth rate of the output between period t to period
t + 1 such that
γy(ξ) 
E(y∗
t+1)
E(y∗
t)
.
It immediately follows that
γy(ξ) =
¯ h∗
t+1
¯ h∗
t
= γh(ξ).
16This is consistent with the evidence found by Alesina and Perotti (1996) that inequality
increases political instability. However, the main focus of this paper is the impact of inequal-
ity on growth through corruption rather than political stability. With regard to this point,
Keefer and Knack (2002) show that there is little change in the negative impact of inequality
on growth through the weakening of property right protection even if political instability is
controlled.
16Therefore, on average, the growth rate of output coincides with that of the
average human capital, which is decreasing in ξ.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an expansion of inequality de-
presses educational investment and impedes the growth of output.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the negative eﬀect of inequality on economic growth
in developing countries —a topic that previous theoretical studies have not
explained clearly. As a new mechanism, we focus on the role of corruption by
politicians. Corruption seems to be more prevalent in developing countries, and
it impedes investment and economic growth. In the model presented in this
paper, the politician can extract corruption rent, which reduces the provision
of public goods and sacriﬁces the welfare of citizens. However, citizens can
control the behavior of the politician to some degree by not supporting him or
her. If a large share of citizens do not support the politician, he or she loses
political power with high probability. In such a situation, the politician must be
concerned about citizens’ political support in order to maintain political power.
When inequality among citizens is large, political support is less sensitive to a
decrease in corruption rents. Therefore, large inequality increases corruption
and impedes investment and economic growth. Our results are consistent with
empirical studies on the relationship between inequality and corruption and that
between corruption and growth.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
By simple calculation, ϵp is shown to be decreasing in θ, and ϵr is shown to be
increasing in θ. Furthermore, we obtain
lim
θ→ 1
α(1+ ξ
2 )
ϵp(θ;ξ) = 1, lim
θ→1
ϵp(θ;ξ) =
1
α
(
1 +
ξ
2
)
  1
< 1
ϵr(0) = 0, lim
θ→1
ϵr(θ) = 1.
Assumption 1 implies that 0 < 1
α(1+
ξ
2) < 1. Thus, as shown in Figure 2, the
ratio of public spending that satisﬁes (22) is shown to be uniquely existing.
17Proof of Lemma 4
Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium ratio of public good provision θ(ξ) satisﬁes
1
α(1 +
ξ
2)
< θ(ξ) =
[
α
(
1 +
ξ
2
)]− 1
2
< 1,
and the equilibrium probability of political stability is given by
p(θ;ξ) =
1
2
+
1
ξ
[
1  
1
αθ(ξ)
]
.
Therefore, we have
dp
dξ
=  
1
ξ2
[
1  
1
αθ(ξ)
]
+
1
αξ[θ(ξ)]2θ′(ξ)
=
1
αξ2θ(ξ)
{
1   αθ(ξ)  
αξ
4
[θ(ξ)]2
}
,
where we use θ′(ξ) =  α
4[θ(ξ)]3.
By substituting θ(ξ) =
[
α
(
1 +
ξ
2
)]− 1
2
, we have
1   αθ(ξ)  
αξ
4
[θ(ξ)]2 = 1  
(
α
1 +
ξ
2
) 1
2
 
ξ
4
(
1 +
ξ
2
)
< 1  
1 +
ξ
4
1 +
ξ
2
 
ξ
4
(
1 +
ξ
2
) = 0,
where inequality arises from Assumption 2. Since the sign of
dp
dξ coincides with
that of [1   αθ(ξ)  
αξ
4 [θ(ξ)]2], we have
dp
dξ < 0.
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